“Diversity” has become a staple of contemporary discourse. Undoubtedly, this is a positive development. Yet diversity discussions frequently drift from descriptive observation to normative prescription—from a neutral category to a moral imperative. And when the “dogma of diversity” begins to silence critical inquiry as illegitimate, it is time to pause and examine more deeply.

I find myself in many conversations—especially with HR—where questions around diversity have become routine. That in itself is a welcome change. I still remember times when no one paid attention at all.

However, over time, these discussions tend to shift: from analytical inquiry to judgments of quality; from open exploration to quotas and targets. And this is where we should hesitate. There is a crucial difference between diversity as a descriptive category and diversity as a moral norm. When the latter becomes hegemonic—when its advocates begin to hunt down the “non-diverse” with all the zeal of the Spanish Inquisition—critical thinkers and responsible leaders must take a step back. We must ask: why has this discourse become so dominant, and where do its limits lie?

Let us begin with the obvious: diversity discourses emerged as a necessary response to longstanding injustices. A narrow-minded, exclusionary archetype of personhood had dominated our societies and institutions—used as a benchmark against which others were judged and enculturated. Hence, the removal of biases and actual hurdles (be they physical, procedural, or cognitive) — in the form of programmes that seek to acknowledge, recognise and integrate specific minorities — is not only highly desirable, it is essential. Especially in matters of access and admission, as a society we must ensure equity, not equality, of access. This also means recognising that diversity necessarily exists—every person is unique— and any categorisation into convenient groupings can already be a distorting device.

That said, we must be careful not to reify diversity—treating it as inherently good, universally beneficial, or normatively binding. There are several reasons for caution.

Despite frequent claims, more diversity does not automatically lead to better organisational performance. Popular diversity metrics—gender, ethnicity, age, tenure, sector, disability, etc.—do not necessarily correlate with diversity of thought or talent. In fact, in my experience in business, many of the allegedly “diverse” people on paper often share identical educations, neighbourhoods, and worldviews. And they often reason in precisely the same way. Moreover, even when genuine diversity exists, its effect on performance is non-linear: greater variance often produces both higher highs and lower lows. The spread of performance widens — with more “outliers” across the spectrum. And that is unsurprising. Increased heterogeneity tends to produce friction, ambiguity, and the need for bridge-building. Whether diversity “pays” depends strongly on investment in community, culture, and the (necessarily higher) quality of leadership. Absent that, performance may easily decline.

But my greater concern is ethical. Diversity, in its essence, is a descriptive term: it acknowledges differences in the composition of communities, societies or individuals, by introducing — often arbitrary — categories of analysis. It has no intrinsic moral value. It is neither good nor bad, just or unjust, to be “more diverse.” This is where people seem to unduly jump from a question of “access” to a role or office — which in principle should be attainable by all and independent of the applicants’ makeup or origins — to a question of “merit”. The leap from underrepresentation to corrective allocation often substitutes justice of access with injustice in selection.

This shift is frequently justified through a “corrective” or reparative view of justice, wherein competence is partially displaced by an arithmetic of representation—based on historical inequalities. Whether through demographic sampling, minimum quotas, or arbitrary “balancing”, such measures imply that institutional legitimacy should derive from surface-level distributions of externally discernable characteristics rather than functional excellence.

Indisputably, there is a great need to face historical injustices with seriousness and political honesty. However, the question here is whether a change in access to societal or organisational roles is the most adequate means of reparation. Unsurprisingly, some of such claims arise from the logic of individualistic identity politics—mobilising the interests of particular groups under the banner of justice, marked by considerable self-righteousness and scant regard for institutional coherence or excellence. And this is precisely where, in my view, diversity becomes dumb. In a democratic society, institutional arrangements should ensure that public office is entrusted to those most capable of serving the common good, rather than privileging individual ambitions to secure access on the basis of sectional claims or distributional entitlement.

Certainly we must make sure that we enable any member of the populace to attain such office. But when we elevate a descriptive feature of people into a normative right, we commit a category error. We risk correcting injustice with new injustice.

In short, we must differentiate three domains:

a. Access
Here, diversity matters profoundly. Every individual must be free to seek roles and participate in society without prejudice or the weight of inherited disadvantage. It is a disgrace when immature societies exclude people on the basis of irrelevant characteristics. Indeed, far more is required—not only the reform of corporate selection processes, but also the pursuit of substantive equity for every child from birth. In this context, even when we design D&I programmes, we must remain conscious that our categories are always arbitrary. Beyond the legitimate removal of barriers and prejudices, we must recall that each person deserves personalised support to realise their unique excellence—not because of group affiliation, but because of human singularity. As Amartya Sen reminds us: freedom means the freedom to develop. And we must take care that equity is not crowded out by diktats of equality—for, as has often been observed, there is nothing more unequal than the equal treatment of unequals.

b. Effectiveness
When it comes to organisational performance, we must resist the temptation to fetishise diversity. In practice, it is often inclusion—the capacity to integrate, respect, and collaborate—that proves the greater challenge. For teams and communities to thrive, what ultimately matters is not difference alone, but the ability to forge integration, cohesion, and shared purpose. In this context, one might of course argue that it is not diversity itself but the greater effectiveness of certain groups that matters for performance—for instance, the claim that women make more caring leaders, or that young people might bring fresh ideas. Yet such reasoning, first, risks reintroducing the very stereotypes diversity seeks to dismantle, and second, underscores the necessity of properly defining selection processes by the required competencies of individuals rather than the surface characteristics of groups.

c. Governance
In the realm of leadership and governance, it is essential to distinguish distributive from contributive justice. Diversity of thought can indeed enrich institutions and organisations, yet effectiveness is not synonymous with justice. Representation matters—but it cannot be allowed to eclipse merit, judgment, or integrity. Wise governance requires diverse perspectives, yes, but equally demands rigorous standards. What is decisive is not the imposition of arbitrary quotas, but the dismantling of structural injustice; not diversity for its own sake, but wisdom, competence, and character.

To conclude:
We certainly should pursue diversity (of thought!) to enhance perspective-taking and effectiveness in decision-making processes. But we must at the same time preserve the standards of merit, contribution, and competence in our standards for participation. Not everyone with a voice must have a vote. Not every difference deserves a seat. And not every inequity can be solved by a quota.

Justice demands more than good intentions. It demands good judgment.

(Published: JAN 14 2023)